



## *Call for Papers for the PADEMIA Annual Conference 2015*

### **Panel 1: Parliaments and Foreign Policy**

It is often argued that foreign and security policy is (and even should be) dominated by the executive, with parliaments wielding marginal or at best limited influence. A viable tradition in political theory holds that the role of parliament does and should stop at the 'water's edge' where an area of executive privileges and responsibilities begin. However, with two notable exceptions, legislative-executive relations in the realm of foreign and security policy have attracted remarkably little scholarly attention. One exception is the recent wave of studies on the parliamentary control of military missions that have emerged in the wake of the so-called Democratic Peace debate. The other exception is the vast number of studies on the US Congress whose unparalleled power has made it impossible to ignore in any comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy. For almost every other democratic country, however, the study of legislative-executive relations in external relations short of the use of force is by and large uncharted territory. Hence there is a demand for subjecting this notion of alleged 'executive drift' in foreign affairs to careful empirical scrutiny, which is the aim of this panel.

The papers should focus on the following themes: 1) parliamentary control of international negotiations (e.g. trade or environmental policy); 2) parliamentary engagement in security policy; 3) interparliamentary cooperation in foreign affairs; or 4) the party politics of parliamentary involvement in foreign affairs. Both case studies and comparative papers are welcome as long as they provide empirical evidence of parliamentary engagement in foreign policy.

To apply, please send an abstract of no more than 250 words to the panel organizer Tapio Raunio, [tapio.raunio@uta.fi](mailto:tapio.raunio@uta.fi), by **15 May 2015**.

## **Panel 2: National Parliaments and the EP in the new EU Economic Governance**

Many policy papers that have been produced in the wake of the Eurocrisis conclude on the need to reinforce “mechanisms for democratic legitimacy and accountability” (see typically the four presidents’ report of December 2012). Concretely, that generally involves a closer engagement of parliaments in the policy process. In actual fact, however, few parliaments seem to have been able to keep up with the changes in economic policy coordination in recent years. Here the big exception is the German *Bundestag* (with due thanks to the *Bundesverfassungsgericht*) and, arguably, some parliaments in other creditor countries. However, the general impression is that national parliaments have been sidelined in a much reinforced two-level game in which governments commit to policy promises to Europe very early on and the budgetary powers of parliaments are reduced to the power to assent to these. Even more dramatic have been the experiences of parliaments in programme countries which have effectively been sidelined by the demands of the Troika, the recent attempts of Greek politics to change the terms notwithstanding. For sure, there have been initiatives of parliaments to adapt. As COSAC reports testify, some parliaments (like the Danish *Folketinget*) have developed ways to stay more closely involved in the European Semester. Also short of much actual controls in the European Semester, the European Parliament is involved in economic dialogue with the European institutions and hosts a parliamentary week early in the year. And the interparliamentary conference of financial and economic governance has been getting off the ground.

This panel invites both empirical and theoretical papers on the involvement of parliaments in the EU economic governance. Empirically, it is open to papers that document formal changes in parliaments’ mode of procedure as well as their actual involvement. These may be comparative in character or involve case studies of notable cases. Also studies of inter-parliamentary coordination on economic governance, including the interparliamentary conference, are very much welcome, as well as on cross-national party alignment on the relevant issues. From a more normative theoretical point of view, we would particularly welcome papers that address and conceptualize the fate of fundamental normative principles like the rule of law, parliamentary sovereignty and executive accountability in the fuzzy and crisis-driven “coordinatory” governance structures that have emerged.

To apply, please send an abstract of no more than 250 words to the panel organizer Ben Crum, [ben.crum@vu.nl](mailto:ben.crum@vu.nl), by **15 May 2015**.

### **Panel 3: The EU Legislative Output in Times of Crisis**

The aim of this panel is to assess the potential consequences of the Eurozone crisis on the legislative activity of the EU. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, the EU had to face many challenges, both economic and political. This may affect the overall institutional “architecture” of the European Union, be it in terms of productivity or in terms of working methods. Therefore one can wonder what kind of impact the crisis has on the overall legislative activity of the EU and its institutions. For instance, does the legislative output decrease? Does the level of political conflict within and between EU institutions increase? Does the left-right split in the EP become more evident?

The proposals may explore these consequences through four different approaches:

- A macro institutional approach: does the crisis affect the general political activity of the EU? To what extent? For instance, is the EU less able to adopt legislative acts? Does the decision-making process take more time?
- An inter-institutional approach: does the crisis affect the nature of the relationships between institutions? Can we observe for instance more conflicting relationships between the European Parliament and the Council during codecision negotiations for instance? On the contrary, does the crisis lead the institutions to “turn a blind eye” to the situation and strengthen the links between them -which would be for instance observable through the number of EP amendments agreed by the Council.
- An intra-institutional approach: are the working methods of the institutions evolving due to the crisis? Is the rule of “consensus” broken within institutions? Does the left-right or the pro-anti EU integration in the European Parliament become more evident due to the crisis? Does the national logic step into the Council?
- A “policy” approach: one may assume that the economic and financial sector is more exposed to evolutions than the others. These evolutions may be grasped through a raise/shrinking of the number of texts introduced, or through an evolution in the ideological content of the texts.

To apply, please send an abstract of no more than 250 words to the panel organizer Selma Bendjaballah, [se.bendja@wanadoo.fr](mailto:se.bendja@wanadoo.fr), by **15 May 2015**.

#### **Panel 4: Political Parties and Parliamentarism**

This panel will be concerned with two integral parts of our perception of democratic and representative government: Political parties and parliaments, or parliamentarism in general. In the last decade, parliamentarism in Europe has enjoyed an extensive increase in scholarly attention. Parliaments have been regarded as actors in their own right, seeking to maximize their powers vis-à-vis other institutions. The career paths, parliamentary activity and loyalties of single MPs have further been the target of academic analyses. In this panel, we want to have a closer look at a different set of “actors” which structure parliamentary work: political parties, with a special focus on their relationship to parliamentarism. Even if many scholars argue that the time of mass parties structuring large parts of citizens’ political and social lives has come to an end, political parties still hold a vital position in contemporary democratic political systems. Arguably, even more so in Europe than in other parts of the world. The new wave of parliamentary studies has only marginally included political parties in its research agenda.

How do parties function within a parliamentary framework? How do parliamentary rules affect parties’ behavior? Can we establish relationships between certain characteristics of a chamber and the respective partisan dynamics? Which role can and do parties play in fulfilling the prominent communication function ascribed to parliaments? We invite papers that study the impact of political parties on parliamentary procedures and vice-versa.

To apply, please send an abstract of no more than 250 words to the panel organizer Alexander Hoppe, [alexander.hoppe@uni-koeln.de](mailto:alexander.hoppe@uni-koeln.de), by **15 May 2015**.

## **Panel 5: Taking stock: towards a new Research Agenda for Parliamentary Democracy in Europe**

Taking stock: towards a new research agenda for parliamentary democracy in Europe

The Lisbon Treaty that came into force in December 2009 extended the EU's legislative competences to more policy areas and introduced new offices and institutions at the EU level, which also impacted on domestic politics. National parliaments have been observed to be increasingly mainstreaming their EU affairs scrutiny, that is blurring the distinction between national and European policies and involving larger numbers of MPs, in order to keep up with EU politics (Gattermann, Högenauer & Huff 2013). On the other hand, the European Parliament sought to further extend its own powers and legitimacy in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty. It had interpreted the new provisions as to put forward its own candidate for Commission President during the 2014 election campaigns. The successful election, of Jean-Claude Juncker gave the European Parliament a greater say in EU politics which has consequences for future developments in EU democracy (Hobolt 2014).

At the same time, these developments also suggest a trend of politicization of EU affairs: the top candidates who had been nominated by the major European party families campaigned across Europe and took part in several pan-European televised debates, which has been novel in EU politics. On the other hand, a growing number of EU citizens oppose further integration, including a common immigration policy or amendments to the freedom of movement, while the Eurozone crisis continues to put European institutions and national political leaders under pressure in their attempts to resolve debts and recession. Moreover, populist and extremist parties are gaining considerable electoral support across Europe.

We ask: Is it time to reconsider our research agenda? Which theoretical and methodological approaches serve best to answer current questions? The aim of this panel is to take stock of the research agenda and to discuss potential avenues for future research on parliamentary democracy in Europe. This can take the form of amending, revising or reviving our existing approaches. We invite papers that that seek to address this aim by either (a) theoretical or conceptual reflection of our current research agenda, or (b) innovative methodological approaches to the study of European parliamentary democracy.

To apply, please send an abstract of no more than 250 words to the panel organizer Katjana Gattermann, [K.Gattermann@uva.nl](mailto:K.Gattermann@uva.nl), by **15 May 2015**.