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# **Opportunities, Strategies and Ideologies: The Incentives of European Parliament Political Groups for Inter-parliamentary Cooperation**

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# Opportunities, Strategies and Ideologies: The Incentives of European Parliament Political Groups for Inter-parliamentary Cooperation

Katjana Gattermann

## Abstract

*This paper investigates the incentives of European Parliament political groups to engage in institutionalised ways of inter-parliamentary cooperation (IPC). It draws on registration lists of Joint Parliamentary Meetings (JPMs) between 2005 and 2011. The paper argues that although the EP and its members are an active promoter of IPC, political parties have varying interests in maintaining a dialogue with national parliamentarians. The findings suggest that although registration rates at JPMs seem to be declining over the years, there is a considerable degree of variation between the political groups. To explain this variation the paper employs a multivariate regression analysis. The results show that larger parties and more cohesive groups are more inclined to take part in JPMs than members of smaller and less cohesive groups. Members belonging to groups which do not electorally support the European Commission also register more often than those of majority groups. Eurosceptic political groups register their attendance less often than pro-European ones. Explanations for these phenomena are linked to the ideology of political groups, their strategies for influencing policy outcomes at the EU level and the opportunity to meet fellow party member at JPMs. Overall, the findings have implications for understanding party group behaviour at the European level as well as for the EU's democratic deficit debate.*

Keywords: Democratic deficit, European Parliament, European Union, inter-parliamentary co-operation, political parties

# Opportunities, Strategies and Ideologies: The Incentives of European Parliament Political Groups for Inter-parliamentary Cooperation

*Katjana Gattermann<sup>1</sup>*

## Introduction

The Lisbon Treaty has strengthened parliamentary rights in the EU decision-making process. At the European level, the ordinary legislative procedure expands the European Parliament's co-decision powers to more policy areas. Its veto powers as part of the of the consent procedure have also been extended. At the same time, 'national parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of the Union' (Art. 12 TEU). The new stipulations acknowledge their rights of direct information, participation in the Early Warning System and inter-parliamentary cooperation. When viewing the EU as a 'multilevel parliamentary field' (Crum and Fossum 2009) whereby representation of EU citizens follows two channels – via the national parliament and the EP, the interaction of the parliamentary institutions at both levels becomes relevant for studying their contribution to democratic legitimacy of EU politics. Cross-level inter-parliamentary cooperation (IPC), either formalised or via informal channels, may facilitate political equality and foster shared accountabilities in the EU political system – two core principles of democracy subject to assessment of multi-level governance (see Kohler-Koch & Rittberger 2007; Rittberger 2010).

The literature has paid some attention to the phenomenon of IPC in the past. One research stream focusses on the interaction between national parliaments. Here, research questions especially address the ability of national parliaments to co-ordinate effectively with respect to subsidiarity control via COSAC<sup>2</sup> and IPEX<sup>3</sup>, and through the network of parliamentary representatives in the EP (e.g., Kaczyński 2011; Knutelská 2011; Neuhold 2011; Cooper 2013). Other studies examine the relationship between the parliaments at both levels more closely providing insight into the varying preferences of institutions (e.g., Westlake 1995; Costa & Latek 2001; Neunreither 2005; Ruiz de Garibay 2010, 2011).

Turning away from the institutional level, recent studies acknowledge that political parties represent an important vessel of inter-parliamentary cooperation. Surveys with members of the

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<sup>2</sup> 'Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of Parliaments of the European Union', which held its inaugural meeting in 1989, but was only formally recognised in a Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union of the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997.

<sup>33</sup> 'Inter-parliamentary EU information exchange', established by the Conference of Speakers of the Parliaments of the European Union in 2000.

European Parliament (MEPs) reveal further that they are in close interaction with their national parties, with the former being rather independent of the party executive (Raunio 2000) and at the same time more likely to initiate contact (Miklin & Crum 2011) – although cross-party variation prevails. While Miklin and Crum (2011) contend that political parties represent more relevant and influential channels of IPC than formal institutions, explanations for varying party preferences for IPC still deserve more attention. In this respect, Miklin (2013) investigates the extent to which national political parties in Austria engage in transnational cooperation. He argues that parliamentary status and ideology of a party matter for the extent to which it becomes involved in IPC.

This paper investigates the incentives of the political groups in the EP to engage in institutionalised ways of IPC. To do so, it draws on registration lists of Joint Parliamentary Meetings (JPMs) between 2005 and 2011 (for a similar approach, see Wagner 2013). The paper is guided by the following questions: Do we find variation in registration rates of EP political groups at JPMs? And if so, which factors explain this variation? Unlike the joint meetings of the Conference of Speakers and COSAC, JPMs are co-organised and hosted by the EP in Brussels and are chaired by the EP President and the President of the parliament of the country holding the rotating EU Presidency. I am aware that JPMs might not be representative of other and more informal ways of co-operation between parties at the European and national level, for instance, under the umbrella of European parties. However, in the absence of comparative data this paper represents a first attempt to shed light on the varying incentives of EP political groups for IPC.

The paper argues that the opportunity to meet party political fellows at JPMs, the different ideologies of political groups as well as their strategies to exert influence in EU politics matter for the motivation of EP groups to register their attendance at JPMs. Even though the paper finds that the registration rates at JPMs seem to be declining over the years, there is a considerable degree of variation between the political groups. The results from the multivariate regression analysis suggest that larger parties and more cohesive groups are more inclined to take part in JPMs which implies that opportunities and ideology are important determinants of their incentives for IPC. Political groups which do not support the Commission also more often indicate their attendance suggesting that for them JPMs serve as an opportunity to meet fellow party members from national parliaments. Since they are at a disadvantage when it comes to information and influence on legislative decisions in the EP this finding also reveals a strategy of these groups. Eurosceptic political groups register their attendance less often than pro-European groups, probably because they are less likely to meet like-minded party fellows and they hold critical stances towards federalists visions of the EU.

The paper proceeds by elaborating on the relationship between the EP and national parliaments followed by deriving hypotheses on the incentives of the EP political groups to engage in IPC.

After that, it presents the data and method and discusses the findings. The conclusions highlight the implications of the results for further research.

## The relationship of the European Parliament with national parliaments

Although the EP used to be rather reluctant to engage with national parliaments in its early days of existence since it had focussed on the improvement of its own rights, in the Maastricht ratification process it more actively called for increasing contacts between parliaments at both levels (Westlake 1995: 70). At this time also, a special unit was created within the EP administration responsible for 'Relations with National Parliaments'. Over the years, the EP has become a zealous promoter of cross-level IPC. In anticipation of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EP, among other things, engaged in improving information exchange via IPEX and modified its rules of procedures to comply with the new treaty provisions (according to its own website for Relations with National Parliaments). The so-called Brok report passed a parliamentary majority on 7 May 2009<sup>4</sup>, stating that '[t]he European Parliament notes with satisfaction that its relations with the national parliaments and their members have developed fairly positively in recent years, but not yet to a sufficient extent [...]' (2008/2120(INI)). Several years later, a steering group observed that '[...] relations between the European Parliament and national parliaments have made important progress in recent years [...]. Yet it is also clear that there is still room for improvement' (European Parliament 2012: 5).

These statements imply that initiatives by the EP for IPC have increased over recent years – and inter-parliamentary activities have become more numerous in general according to Ruiz de Garibay (2011). However, there might be several reasons for the EP to become more active. One motive is of normative nature stressing the development of democratic legitimacy. On the EP's own website for Relations with National Parliaments it says:

*Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation between the European Parliament and National Parliaments is essentially about reinforcing the parliamentary dimension of the European Union by extending democratic control and accountability over decisions at the European Union level and ensuring more transparency and openness in the decision-making process. The aim is to improve the democratic legitimacy, quality and efficiency of the legislative process at the EU level.<sup>5</sup>*

The last sentence provides insight into the EP's own interests since it is one of the main actors in the legislative process at the EU level alongside the European Commission and the Council. It

<sup>4</sup> Elmar Brok, MEP, was appointed rapporteur by the Constitutional affairs Committee on 19 May 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Website: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/cms/pid/1900> (last accessed on 15 June 2012)

suggests that the EP also pursues a rational strategy by fostering IPC – that is to improve its own powers in the EU. In the past, the EP has acted as a constitutional agenda-setter by interpreting existing treaty prescriptions of the co-decision and the investiture procedure in its own favour (Hix 2002). Westlake (1995: 70) already notes in the early days of IPC that ‘[...] above all, the European Parliament’s increasing recognition of the role of national parliaments is bound up in its consistently espoused federalist vision of the European Union’s future constitutional settlement’ whereby the EP will evolve into a lower chamber alongside the Council approximating to a Senate or upper house. In this line, it was in the interest of the EP not to create a new parliamentary body in the EU in the form of a third chamber and at the same time to gain access to national parliaments by means of ‘functional cooperation’ (Neunreither 2005: 467). Costa and Latek (2001: 157) go further to argue that the EP has actively sought support from national parliaments in order to improve its own position vis-à-vis the European Commission and the Council.

With the Lisbon Treaty having formalised the rights of subsidiarity checks by national parliaments, the institutional balance has changed. The Political Dialogue was already initiated by Commission President Barroso in 2006 allowing national parliaments to engage directly with the European Commission at an early stage of the legislative process. Even though national parliaments vary in their direct engagement with the Commission by means of subsidiarity checks (e.g., see Gattermann and Heffler 2013) or the EP (e.g., see Gattermann 2013a), MEPs are supposedly interested in taking part in the informal negotiations by means of formal and informal co-ordination. That way, MEPs gain access to the information exchanged between institutions, may take influence in policy decisions and ultimately avoid a clash of interests.

The Lisbon Treaty has, however, also provided the EP with more comprehensive legislative rights, executive scrutiny and budgetary powers. On the other hand, national parliaments are undermined in their core function, the budgetary function, with the introduction of the European Semester. These developments can be summarised with the words of Raunio (2009: 327): ‘Constitutionally, policy-making powers previously held by the national legislatures have been transferred upwards to the European level’. This process has already started before the Lisbon Treaty came into force, which is supposedly also why some had assessed cross-level parliamentary relations in terms of rivalling competences (Costa & Latek 2001; Neunreither 2005). Later on, Matarazzo (2011: 60) has described the relationship between the EP and the national parliaments as problematic with the Lisbon Treaty having ‘expanded the room for competition, in particular the power of scrutiny of sensitive topics’ (see also Matarazzo & Leone 2011: 140).

Given the central role of the EP in the EU political system and the considerable variation among national parliaments regarding organisation and co-ordination of interests (see Costa and Latek 2001), the EP is able to act as an agenda-setter in the relationship with its national counterparts

(see Ruiz de Garibay 2011). However, the EP is not only a unitary actor when it comes to its own interests; party groups constitute the heart of labour division inside the EP – legislative offices are allocated according to group strength. In addition, they represent the political channel of their representatives' interests, who directly elect them in European elections, and as such play a crucial role for EU policy-making. Hence, the focus of this paper lies on the incentives of the EP's political groups to register their attendance at JPMs. The following section derives hypotheses related to the opportunities of EP political groups to meet party fellows from national parliaments, their ideologies and their strategies for influencing policy outcomes at the EU level.

## **Hypothesising varying incentives of European Parliament political groups to engage in IPC**

To assess variation in registration rates at JPMs across political groups in the EP, we first need to understand the purpose of these meetings. According to the European Parliament (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011), JPMs do not serve to produce 'common conclusions' but rather aim at:

- 'Promoting inter-parliamentary dialogue on major policy areas, even if they are not (yet) always the focus of the EU legislative action'
- 'Improving parliamentary awareness of the need for oversight and control over decisions taken at EU level'
- 'Reinforcing the links between MPs and MEPs belonging to the same political families'

The circumstance that JPMs do not produce clear-cut decisions might not motivate members of EP political groups to attend. However, the last point indicates that these meetings are likely to foster inter-parliamentary exchange with party fellows from national parliaments. And since we know that most informal communication takes place via national alliances (Raunio 2000; Miklin & Crum 2011), these meetings represent an opportunity for EP political groups to meet with national political fellows from other member states, which they might not be in frequent contact with at other times (see Miklin & Crum 2011). At the same time, JPMs provide EP political groups with the opportunity to gain access to information from the member states, to communicate their views on political decisions and to give national parliamentarians insight into their intra-parliamentary working modes – hence enabling them to act as agenda-setter in the relationship with national parliaments. These opportunities would answer the first question of this paper about whether EP political groups actually register their attendance at JPMs. Yet, we still require plausible explanations for their varying incentives to do so. This paper argues that their strategy and ideology are two further crucial determinants of their motivation.

The institutional relations between the EP and the executive, the European Commission, provide insight into the nature of EP party politics. With respect to the EP's elective function 'the

procedures for selecting and deselecting the Commission have become a hybrid mix of the parliamentary and presidential models' (Hix and Høyland 2011: 45). As in presidential systems, the EP is electorally independent of the Commission: the latter cannot dissolve the Parliament, but the EP may vote the whole Commission out of office with a two-thirds majority of the votes cast (Art. 234 TFEU). The similarities to the parliamentary model are that party political conflict has increasingly formed along government versus opposition divides both inside the EP and in its relationship with the Commission (see Hix et al. 2007). The Commission and its President are nominated by the national governments, and have up until now not been selected from within the EP. It follows that there is no 'inbuilt government majority in the European Parliament' (Hix et al., 2007: 21). However, the EP has voted on the designated Commission President and his cabinet since Maastricht, even though it only received the formal right to do so by the Treaty of Amsterdam (Art. 214.2 TEC) (see Hix 2002). The Treaty of Lisbon now prescribes that the governments must consider the majority constellations in the EP in their nominations of Commissioner-designates (Article 17.7 TEU). This shows that party politics play a crucial role for European politics.

Several instances of party political clashes during the censure and investiture procedures in the past underline this relevance: The Conservatives and Christian Democrats in the EP openly opposed the Santer Commission before the latter resigned over allegations of fraud and financial mismanagement in early 1999. In October 2004 Commission President Barroso was forced to reshuffle his cabinet choice following explicit disapproval by the Socialists, the Greens and the Liberals in the EP against Rocco Buttiglione. He was chosen as Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security, but was critical about rights of homosexuals and gender equality. And in January 2010 the Liberals and Greens openly opposed the Bulgarian Commissioner-designate and former Christian-democrat MEP, Rumiana Jeleva. Her husband was accused of holding connections to organised crime. Some, Conservatives, on the other hand, raised their doubts with respect to the candidacy of some Social-Democrats, especially Catherine Ashton and Maroš Šefčovič.

These developments indicate that criticism towards the EU executive is following party political lines suggesting divides between the parliamentary majority, which coincides with the political composition of the Commission, and the minority, i.e. opposition. And research actually demonstrates that intra-institutional party politics have been increasing in recent years with greater intra-group cohesion and ideological convergence rather than accumulation of national interests (e.g., Hix & Kreppel 2003; Hix et al. 2007). It follows that European political party groups are likely to have varying incentives to influence legislative policy outcomes similar to parties in any other parliament across Europe.

Opposition parties are generally considered to be at a disadvantage regarding information and influence via parliamentary office and resources. Even though the informational advantage of EP

majority parties might be small – due to the absence of direct links between the executive and the parliamentary majority – IPC might nevertheless represent different incentives for the minority parties in the EP. Due to their small seat share in the EP, these groups have difficulties to alter policy-making in plenary debates or votes. In order to for them to take influence onto policy decisions, alternative ways might seem more feasible than trying to reach a consensus with political groups of different ideology. Miklin (2013) argues that opposition parties in the Austrian Parliament ascribe more importance to IPC and also engage to a greater extent in IPC than governing parties. Similarly, it can be expected that IPC offers an important channel of influence for minority parties in the EP via national parliaments, and ultimately the Council. Acting strategically by participating in IPC increases the odds for more favourable policy outcomes at the European level.

**H<sub>1</sub>: EP political groups of the parliamentary minority vis-à-vis the European Commission are likely to register their attendance at JPMs more often than majority parties.**

Similarly, larger groups are able to rely on more resources and a larger extra-parliamentary network of supporters and allies across European member states. One may assume that the small party groups such as the Greens or the Liberals in the EP are also rather under-represented in the domestic political context – most of them are elected because of their marginal role in domestic politics (e.g., see Hix & Marsh 2007, 2011). It follows that these smaller parties are less likely to have built a large and stable network across Europe. Hence, the chances are lower that they are able to coordinate informally. That is why one may expect that small political groups more often make use of the opportunity to engage in institutionalised ways of IPC and have strategic incentives to participate in JPMs (cf. Miklin 2013: 40).

**H<sub>2</sub>: Smaller EP political groups are likely to register their attendance at JPMs more often than larger groups.**

Miklin (2013) furthermore argues that the degree of ‘ideological fit’ matters for the extent to which an individual party engages in IPC. He thereby describes the abilities of Austrian national parties to co-ordinate under the umbrella of European political groups: His results show that the far-right parties FPÖ and BZÖ, who are not affiliated with any political group in the EP, are only to a limited extent engaged in IPC. In the EP, ‘ideological fit’ can be measured by levels of intra-group cohesion (e.g., see Hix et al. 2007). National parties within the EP groups are close to their domestic party and in terms of policy preferences – not least because MEPs would like to become re-selected by the party leadership; and they have frequent informal contacts (Miklin and Crum 2011). It follows that more cohesive party groups are likely to have more similar political allies across Europe and hence able to exchange political views with like-minded politicians. Less cohesive political groups are likely to consist of national parties which differ considerably in their

political views. This infers a larger potential for political conflict which EP political groups might want to avoid by not attending meetings of IPC.

**H3: The more cohesive an EP political group, the higher the incentives for registering their attendance at JPMs.**

Miklin (2013) is less convinced that a party's ideology itself impacts on the motivation to engage in IPC – at least in the Austrian case. Similarly, Weßels (1999) finds that MEPs from left and right do not differ in their views over the desired scope of IPC in the future. Nevertheless, for political groups in the EP it can be expected that ideological cleavages matter for the attendance rates of JPMs. Left-right politics constitute an important cleavage in the EP, but the pro-anti EU cleavage matters as well (cf. Hix & Lord 1997; Hooghe & Marks 2001). In recent years, Eurosceptic parties have become increasingly elected to the EP (e.g., Hix & Marsh 2011), dividing political groups into a pro-European majority and an anti-European minority. One would expect that Eurosceptic hardliners with their calls for withdrawing from EU membership (cf. Taggart & Szczerbiak 2008) are not supportive of any federal type of co-operation between the EP and the national parliaments. Yet, Costa and Latek (2001: 152) argue that Eurosceptic politicians would be in favour of IPC – at least between national parliaments – if that was to strengthen the powers of national parliaments in the EU. Eurosceptic groups might be less in favour of the EP as a supranational and generally pro-integration institution taking the lead in IPC. In addition, Eurosceptic MEPs are also likely to be less engaged in the EP in general (cf. Brack 2012). This might also be reflected in their attendance of JPMs and might therefore also reveal a strategic motive of these Eurosceptic groups.

**H4: Eurosceptic political groups in the EP are likely to register their attendance at JPMs less often than pro-European parties.**

## Data and method

The analysis rests on registration rates at JPMs between 2005 and 2011. I obtained information about the frequency and agenda of 22 JPMs from the EP Directorate for Relations with National Parliaments. For 19 of these JPMs the registration numbers of MEPs have been recorded by political group. Even though registration numbers might be higher than attendance rates, they still serve as an indicator for the interest of political groups to take part in JPMs. It follows that the dependent variable of this paper is estimated as the number of MEPs of a political group – and non-attached members<sup>6</sup> – who registered to attend each JPM relative to the total number of seats of the respective grouping within the EP. It ranges from 0 to 40.74 (see Appendix Figure A.1).

<sup>6</sup> All models are reproduced without the non-attached and are shown in the Appendix Tables A3 and A4 for comparison.

The data have a panel structure around EP political groups. Many of the key independent variables are constants. Hence I calculate the regressions by employing random-effects models with robust standard errors. This allows us to assess within and between-group effects. Time-fixed effects are not included in the models because of multicollinearity problems: several control variables, which are presented below, exhibit variation over time.

The main independent variables are operationalized according to the research hypotheses. The parliamentary status represents a dummy variable and classifies the EPP (European People's Party), the PES/S&D (Party of European Socialists/ Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats) and ALDE (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) as majority parties (0), and the remaining parties, including the Greens/EFA (European Greens - European Free Alliance), as minority parties (1) for both parliamentary terms (*Opposition to Commission* – H1). Group size is calculated by the seat share of a political group relative to the total number of seats for each legislative term (*Seat share* – H2). The measure for the cohesion of each political group was obtained from *votewatch.eu* and estimated separately for each year of the investigation (*Cohesion* – H3). It ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values representing greater levels of cohesion. Lastly, a dummy variable classifies UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations), and IND/DEM (Independence/Democracy Group) for the 6th legislative term (2004-2009) as well as GUE/NGL (European United Left/ Nordic Green Left), ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) and EFD (Europe of Freedom and Democracy) for the current Parliament and the non-attached (NI) for both terms as Eurosceptic (1), and the remaining parties as non-Eurosceptic (*Eurosceptic* – H4). I am aware that this is a rather crude measure, but the 2009 Euromanifestos Project, which is a prominent source for party positions towards EU integration, does not yet comprise two Eurosceptic groups, the ECR and EFD.


The models also include several controls. A dummy indicates whether an EU summit was held in the same month of the JPM (*EU summit/month*). It is likely that JPMs are more attractive for EP political groups when the Council gathers at about the same time. To control for concurrent meetings taking place on the same date of the JPM, two dummies are included that refer to plenary meetings and meetings of committees (reference category: political groups). Members of EP political groups are likely to deem these meetings more important than JPMs. Since the time period of investigation includes the June 2009 elections to the European Parliament, a continuous variable measures the squared distance in months to the election date (see Gattermann 2013b for a similar measure for national elections). Larger values indicate that the EP elections are further away. A positive effect can be expected since political parties are supposedly busy with the campaigns before the elections. The dummy *6<sup>th</sup> Parliament* considers all JPMs (14) of the 6<sup>th</sup> legislative term. The reference category is the current term (concerning 5 JPMs). Furthermore, dummies describing the agendas of each meeting are included: *Budget, Economy, Finances; Freedom, Security & Justice; Climate Change; Western Balkans; Energy; Migration*. The reference

category refers to meetings on the 'Future of Europe'. Some topics might attract more MEPs than others.


## Findings

Before the research hypotheses are being investigated, it is sensible to assess the distribution of attendance rates over time. Figure 1 depicts the overall number of MEP registrations at JPMs between the years 2005 and 2011 in comparison to the number of national parliamentarians and parliamentary clerks.

**Figure 1** Registration rates at JPMs, 2005-2011 (N=22)



Obviously, registration rates for national members of Parliament are higher since they come together from 25 to 27 member states. And while their rates fluctuate considerably over time, registration numbers for MPs, staff and MEPs seem to have been slightly declining in recent years. This suggests that JPMs become less appealing over time. Other forms of inter-parliamentary meetings such as joint and inter-parliamentary committee meetings as well as individual visits from officials of national parliaments might receive higher levels of attention by MPs and MEPs alike (e.g., see Ruiz de Garibay 2011: 5). However, that shall not concern us here. Instead, the focus of this paper lies on the registration rates of EP political groups at JPMs relative to their total number of seats. Figure 2 shows that we do not find a general trend of declining interests in each political group. Instead, variation in registration is greatest across political groups.

**Figure 2** JPM registration rates by EP political group, ,2005-2011 (N=19)


The figure shows that at the beginning of the period under investigation, members of the Eurosceptic UEN were most motivated to attend one particular JPM. Another rather Eurosceptic group, namely GUE, also seemed more inclined to register to attend JPMS in 2005/06. The non-attached had higher registration scores in 2008/09 and the EFD in 2010/11. With all of them being classified as Eurosceptic, these figures provide reason to believe that H<sub>4</sub> might not be supported in the models to come. More pro-European political groups were leading the registration lists only in form of the Greens in the years 2006/07, which at the same time belong to the smaller and opposition parties in the EP. Some of the lowest attendance rates were, on the contrary, recorded for ALDE. Conversely, the two major political groups, the PES/S&D and the EPP, do not stand out by registration rates. Overall, the figure is rather untidy. Hence, the regression analysis will provide answers to whether any of the research hypotheses are supported.

Tables 1 and 2 provide the results of the regression models. Models 7 to 12 in Table 2 include the same effects as Models 1 to 6 in Table 1, but exclude two outliers, namely the UEN in April 2005 and the Greens in October 2006 for which the relative registration rates were 40.74% and 28.57%, respectively. The first four models and Models 7 to 10 test the effects of each hypothesis controlling for the remaining effects. These models are estimated separately because of the high correlations between the main independent variables (see Appendix Table A.1). The remaining

models bring all effects together and also include interaction terms of *seat share* and *opposition* as well as *cohesion* and *Eurosceptic* (Models 6 and 12).

**Table 1** Random-effect models, explaining registration rates of EP groups at JPMs

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Opposition to Commission	-0.69 (0.96)				3.04*** (0.47)	2.76*** (0.68)
Seat share		0.04 (0.03)			0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Cohesion			4.85** (2.04)		2.47 (2.30)	19.85 (20.14)
Eurosceptic				-1.84** (0.92)	-2.63*** (0.88)	13.11 (18.40)
Interaction effect Seat share/Opposition						-0.02 (0.02)
Interaction effect Cohesion/Eurosceptic						-17.13 (19.71)
EU summit/month	2.04*** (0.75)	2.04*** (0.75)	2.03*** (0.75)	2.04*** (0.75)	2.03*** (0.76)	2.06*** (0.77)
Concurrent Meeting: Plenary	-2.00** (0.98)	-2.00** (0.98)	-2.00** (0.95)	-2.00** (0.98)	-2.00** (0.97)	-2.14** (0.94)
Concurrent Meeting: Committees	0.90 (3.94)	0.90 (3.94)	0.93 (3.94)	0.90 (3.94)	0.92 (3.99)	0.98 (4.04)
Squared Distance EU elections (months) 6 <sup>th</sup> Parliament	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
	1.16*** (0.33)	1.15*** (0.34)	1.22*** (0.40)	1.09*** (0.33)	1.16*** (0.38)	1.41** (0.67)
Budget, Economy, Finances	3.58 (2.78)	3.58 (2.78)	3.53 (2.77)	3.58 (2.78)	3.55 (2.82)	3.49 (2.88)
Freedom, Security & Justice	0.74 (5.41)	0.74 (5.41)	0.73 (5.40)	0.74 (5.41)	0.74 (5.47)	0.69 (5.51)
Climate Change	-0.40 (3.38)	-0.40 (3.38)	-0.42 (3.37)	-0.40 (3.38)	-0.41 (3.42)	-0.42 (3.44)
Western Balkans	0.47 (3.01)	0.47 (3.01)	0.46 (3.01)	0.47 (3.01)	0.47 (3.04)	0.39 (3.09)
Energy	0.67 (1.14)	0.67 (1.14)	0.67 (1.15)	0.67 (1.14)	0.67 (1.16)	0.72 (1.16)
Migration	0.50 (2.75)	0.50 (2.75)	0.49 (2.77)	0.50 (2.75)	0.50 (2.79)	0.34 (2.90)
Constant	2.77* (1.56)	1.81 (1.44)	-1.40 (2.27)	3.35** (1.58)	0.76 (3.06)	-16.60 (19.06)
DV >20% excluded	no	no	No	no	no	no
R Squared within	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
R Squared between	0.13	0.18	0.34	0.36	0.55	0.55
R Squared overall	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.28	0.31	0.31
N (groups)	10	10	10	10	10	10
N	152	152	152	152	152	152

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable: relative registration numbers of EP groups at JPMs

**Table 2:** Random-effects models, explaining registration rates of EP groups at JPMs II

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Opposition to Commission	-1.23 (0.78)				2.30*** (0.23)	2.37*** (0.39)
Seat share		0.07*** (0.02)			0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Cohesion			4.45** (1.95)		1.51 (1.89)	-1.62 (14.12)
Eurosceptic				-2.03*** (0.57)	-2.31*** (0.31)	-5.20 (12.77)
Interaction effect Seat share/Opposition						0.00 (0.01)
Interaction effect Cohesion/Eurosceptic						3.15 (13.97)
EU summit/month	1.64*** (0.59)	1.64*** (0.59)	1.64*** (0.58)	1.63*** (0.58)	1.64*** (0.59)	1.63*** (0.58)
Concurrent Meeting: Plenary	-1.90* (0.99)	-1.90* (0.99)	-1.89** (0.96)	-1.90* (0.99)	-1.90* (0.99)	-1.87* (1.01)
Concurrent Meeting: Committees	-2.34* (1.34)	-2.35* (1.34)	-2.30* (1.37)	-2.40* (1.34)	-2.39* (1.36)	-2.40* (1.37)
Squared Distance EU elections (months) 6 <sup>th</sup> Parliament	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
	0.85** (0.34)	0.86** (0.35)	1.11*** (0.41)	0.84** (0.34)	0.89** (0.38)	0.84 (0.49)
Budget, Economy, Finances	5.61*** (0.96)	5.62*** (0.96)	5.56*** (0.96)	5.65*** (0.94)	5.63*** (0.95)	5.65*** (0.99)
Freedom, Security & Justice	1.83 (2.76)	1.85 (2.76)	2.08 (2.76)	2.12 (2.74)	2.22 (2.81)	2.23 (2.82)
Climate Change	2.75 (1.85)	2.77 (1.86)	2.72 (1.89)	2.82 (1.89)	2.80 (1.92)	2.80 (1.94)
Western Balkans	3.04** (1.26)	3.05** (1.26)	3.02** (1.26)	3.09** (1.27)	3.08** (1.27)	3.09** (1.30)
Energy	0.06 (0.99)	0.05 (1.00)	0.06 (1.01)	0.05 (1.00)	0.05 (1.01)	0.04 (1.01)
Migration	3.28*** (1.12)	3.29*** (1.12)	3.25*** (1.10)	3.33*** (1.11)	3.32*** (1.13)	3.35*** (1.07)
Constant	4.37*** (0.65)	2.77*** (0.89)	-0.02 (1.93)	4.65*** (0.64)	1.31 (1.89)	4.15 (12.73)
DV >20% excluded	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
R Squared within	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
R Squared between	0.22	0.32	0.32	0.55	0.67	0.67
R Squared overall	0.28	0.30	0.31	0.33	0.35	0.35
N (groups)	10	10	10	10	10	10
N	150	150	150	150	150	150

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable: relative registration numbers of EP groups at JPMs; all models in this table exclude the two outliers

As regards the first hypothesis, it was anticipated that those groups which form part of the parliamentary minority and represent the opposition towards the European executive are more likely to attend JPMs. The effect does only reach conventional levels of statistical significance in the full models (Models 5-6 and 11-12), but nevertheless lends support to the initial hypothesis: holding everything else constant registration rates of members of the parliamentary opposition are about 2.3% to 3.04% higher than for those supporting the Commission. Overall, the findings

show that the incentives of opposition groups in the EP – as far as the attendance of JPMs is concerned – meet the above expectations. The findings imply that JPMs serve as an opportunity for groups from the parliamentary opposition to meet fellow party members from national parliaments to exchange their views since they are at a disadvantage when it comes to information and influence on legislative decisions in the EP. This thereby also reveals a particular strategy of these groups: they are likely to use JPMs to exert influence in EU policy-making.

The second hypothesis predicted that smaller groups are more likely to attend JPMs. Models 5, 6, 8, 11 and 12, however, show the opposite effect: with every percentage point increase in seat share, participation becomes slightly more likely – with about 0.05% to 0.07%. Yet, the interaction effects of seat share and opposition status in Models 6 and 12 are not statistically significant. Thus, we cannot derive conclusions for smaller parties which do not support the European Commission.

One explanation might be that smaller are also rather underrepresented in the national parliament if one considers green or some liberal parties. Smaller parties in the national parliament are less likely to travel to Brussels to meet with MEPs. Similar to the allocation of seats in committees and other parliamentary delegations, it is likely that smaller parties are granted only a limited number of seats in the JPM delegations – if at all (see also Miklin 2013: 30). Furthermore, there are some smaller groups in the EP whose national members are not represented in the national parliament. These include parties representing a European cleavage such as the United Kingdom Independence Party or some far-right political parties such as Front National in France until recently. This might explain why smaller EP groups are less inclined to take part following the findings above: They are less likely to meet their party fellows from national parliaments at JPMs – unlike larger parties, who are supposedly able to rely on a larger extra-parliamentary network, which, contrary our initial expectations, makes them more likely to register their attendance. However, these assumptions do not support any strategy of smaller party groups in the EP to attend JPMs in order to take influence in EU policy-making.

Our third hypothesis, however, receives support from the findings in Models 3 and 9: MEPs of more cohesive groups are more likely to register their attendance at JPMs – every increase in cohesion increases the attendance rate by 4.45% to 4.85%, although these effects are not statistically significant in the full models. This supposedly has to do with the fact that more cohesive parties have a better ‘ideological fit’ (Miklin 2013) with their fellow parties across Europe and hence the motivation to reach a consensus at the meetings is higher. At the same time, MEPs of more cohesive groups do not need to fear political confrontations and hence are more likely to register their attendance.

In line with this argument is the finding that Eurosceptic groups, who also show lower levels of cohesion, less often register their participation at JPMs than more pro-European political groups.

In Models 4, 5, 10 and 11 the effect ranges from -1.84% to -2.31%.<sup>7</sup> The results thus lend support to H4. Here, the lack of a European-wide network, higher levels of intra-group dissent or absence of membership of political groups in the EP as well as the distrust in the supranational lead of the EP in these meetings supposedly all come together and explain why Eurosceptic MEPs are less inclined to take part in JPMs. They are likely to have a different strategy to influence EU policy-making than through formal channels of IPC – if at all. However, the interaction effect between cohesion and Eurosceptic ideology is not statistically significant in this case, either.

Overall, the figures for R Squared reveal that about 27% in the first set of models and 30% in the second set of models can be explained by the time-variant controlling effects (within-group variation). R Squared is higher for models which account for the between-group variation in terms of cohesion (34% in Model 3, 32% in Model 9), Eurosceptic ideology (36% in Model 4, 55% in Model 10) and seat share when the outliers are omitted from the model (32% in Model 8). Put differently, three of our main variables slightly better explain variation in the registration rates at JPMs than time-specific effects and the varying topics of JPMs. In the full models R Squared between groups is even higher, but these figures should be interpreted with caution. The correlations between the main independent variables are relatively high (see Appendix Table A.1). Hence, the full models might exhibit mild forms of multicollinearity.

The control variables reveal other remarkable phenomena. The effect of the EU summit is positive throughout the models suggesting that when meetings of the European Council take place in the same month of a JPM the registration rates for all groups are about 1.63% to 2.06% higher than at other times. This implies that the political environment matters; and MEPs supposedly see an opportunity – and perhaps also pursue a strategy – to exchange their views over the Council's agenda with their colleagues from national parliaments. As regards concurrent meetings, plenary sessions are considered more important than JPMs. If these take place on the same date, registration rates at JPMs are about 1.87% to 2.14% lower compared to meetings in political groups. Parallel meetings in committees only seem to hinder MEPs to register their attendance at JPMs if we disregard the two outliers identified above. Here, the registrations for political groups in the EP are about 2.30% to 2.40% (Models 7 to 12) lower if a committee takes place on the same day as opposed to meetings in political groups. The latter might attract many members from political groups given the occasion of parallel JPMs.

Table 2 also shows that proximity to EU elections has a tiny, yet significant effect (>0.00%): the further away the polling date the slightly higher are the registration rates at JPMs – at least in the models which disregard the above mentioned outliers (Models 7 to 12)<sup>8</sup>. As expected, the political groups are supposedly busy with campaigning and/or planning the new legislative term ahead.

<sup>7</sup> Note that the effect is not statistically significant in Model 4, once the non-attached are removed from the model (see Table A3 in the Appendix).

<sup>8</sup> Note that this effect only complies with conventional levels of statistical significance in Models 7 and 8 when the non-attached are omitted from the models (see Table A4 in the Appendix).

Unfortunately, since it is a squared effect, we are unable to determine whether MEPs are less inclined to take part in JPMs before or after the election date. Nevertheless, the positive and significant coefficient of the dummy *6<sup>th</sup> Parliament* underlines the findings from Figure 1 above: registration rates were slightly higher between 2005 and 2008/09 than for the latter years throughout the models (0.84% to 1.41%).

Lastly, the control dummies describing the agenda of each meeting show that the topic matters for the registration rates at JPMs in the second set of models, which exclude the outliers (Table 2, Models 7 to 12). Registration rates at JPMs dealing with the Western Balkans or Migration were significantly higher – by about 3.02% to 3.35% – than for JPMs discussing the Future of Europe. Similarly, JPMs featuring topics on the budget, the economy or finances on their agenda also attracted more MEPs than meetings on the Future of Europe: here, registration rates are about 5.6% higher. This is not surprising in times of the financial and economic crisis. IPC between the EP and its national counterparts seems to be more attractive when meetings serve to discuss problems and solutions. At the same time, it also suggests that the EP and its members are interested in setting the agenda vis-à-vis national counterparts and influence political decisions via this channel in this policy field, since it only has limited powers to intervene in the decision-making process. While it has the right to be consulted on, for instance, the accession of countries eligible to join the Euro, the Fiscal Compact was subject to intergovernmental political negotiations. However, it allows for a ‘conference of representatives’ (Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Art. 13) between national parliaments and the EP, which they organised in October 2013.

## Conclusions

The paper investigated the incentives of the political groups in the EP to engage in inter-parliamentary cooperation via registration rates at JPMs between 2005 and 2011. While the rates seem to be slightly declining over the years, it was shown that there is considerable variation between the political groups. The findings from the regression analysis show that larger groups and more cohesive parties are more inclined to take part in JPMs. At the same time, however, the registration rates are higher for political groups which do not support the European Commission. Eurosceptic political groups, on the other hand, register their attendance less often.

Explanations for these phenomena were linked to the ideology of political groups, their strategies to influence EU policy-making and the ability to meet fellow party member at JPMs. MEPs from more cohesive groups are likely to meet like-minded party fellows which increases the chances for ideological co-ordination. Those MEPs who are affiliated with Eurosceptic political groups or the non-attached in the EP, on the contrary, might have fewer opportunities to meet national

parliamentarians who share their ideological views. At the same time, JPMs represent the supranational character of EU decision-making, which these MEPs and their colleagues from national parliaments probably reject. The results furthermore imply that opposition groups have incentives to gather information and exchange their views directly with the national counterparts since they are at a disadvantage when it comes to information and influence on legislative decisions in the EP. This does not seem to apply for smaller parties, however. The paper suggested that one reason for the lower registration rates of smaller groups might be that their MEPs are less likely to meet party fellows from the member states, since they are also rather under-represented at home.

The study of JPMs provided insight into the varying incentives of EP political groups to take part in such meetings. Although the data presented here are valid and insightful, the statistical analysis is rather limited due to the small N, and some crude measures of the variables. Another short-coming of the paper is the sole focus on JPMs – other forms of IPC have not been considered. Future research should investigate the incentives of political groups to take part in other types of IPC, such as inter-parliamentary committee meetings which are also chaired by the EP. Lastly, the paper was unable to consider individual preferences of MEPs to take up the opportunities of IPC. Nevertheless, the paper has sought to provide a first attempt in explaining different motives of political groups in the EP to attend meetings of IPC. The research hypotheses and findings may therefore serve as guidance for future research. If topics of the Eurozone crisis continue to attract MEPs, more data will become available. The European Semester, for instance, poses a challenge to both the EP and national parliaments and has already been subject to the European Parliamentary Week organised by the EP in January 2013. In addition, the results also show that JPMs were more attractive for MEPs when an EU summit took place in the same month which suggests that institutionalised forms of IPC are relevant as an inter-parliamentary platform to exchange views on highly relevant political decisions taken by the European governments.

The declining registration rates, however, suggest that the interest in JPMs is decreasing. This raises the question of whether such forms of IPC increase the democratic legitimacy in the EU ‘multi-level parliamentary field’ (Crum & Fossum 2009) and suggests that the parliamentary public sphere in the EU does not necessarily widen. This would eventually impede equal participation and the rise of shared accountabilities. On the other hand, the findings might simply imply that political groups find other ways to channel their political strategies. In fact, since the end of 2011 no additional JPM was organised. Other formats, including inter-parliamentary committee meetings, the regular exchange between chairpersons and rapporteurs of specialised committees have become prominent means of institutionalised IPC over the last few years (see European Parliament 2012) In addition, MEPs hold frequent informal contacts via telephone and email with their domestic party (Miklin and Crum 2011). It remains to be seen in future research how these types of IPC can contribute to combatting the EU democratic deficit.

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
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## Appendix

**Figure A1** Distribution of the dependent variable



**Table A1** Bivariate correlations between the core independent variables

	Opposition to Commission	Seat share	Cohesion	Euroseptic
Opposition to Commission	1			
Seat share	-0.8397***	1		
Cohesion	-0.5270***	0.4844***	1	
Euroseptic	0.7746***	-0.6764***	-0.7088***	1

Note: Pearson Coefficients; N=152; \*\*\* p<0.01

**Table A2 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>
Opposition to Commission	152	0.63	0.49	0	1
Seat share	152	12.47	11.55	3.67	36.41
Cohesion	152	0.77	0.19	0.40	0.96
Eurosceptic	152	0.50	0.50	0	1
Interaction effect Seat share/Opposition	152	6.44	8.00	0	27.17
Interaction effect Cohesion/Eurosceptic	152	0.32	0.34	0	0.87
EU summit/month	152	0.53	0.50	0	1
Concurrent Meeting: Plenary	152	0.05	0.22	0	1
Concurrent Meeting: Committees	152	0.42	0.50	0	1
Squared Distance EU elections (months) 6 <sup>th</sup> Parliament	152	673.16	731.03	16	2500
Budget, Economy, Finances	152	0.74	0.44	0	1
Freedom, Security & Justice	152	0.21	0.41	0	1
Climate Change	152	0.05	0.22	0	1
Western Balkans	152	0.05	0.22	0	1
Energy	152	0.11	0.31	0	1
Migration	152	0.11	0.31	0	1

Note: Cell entries are rounded to two decimals where necessary

**Table A3 Random-effects models, explaining registration rates of EP groups at JPMs (excluding non-attached MEPs)**

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Opposition to Commission	-0.49 (1.10)				2.95*** (0.52)	2.57*** (0.74)
Seat share		0.04 (0.04)			0.05** (0.02)	0.06*** (0.01)
Cohesion			6.12** (2.85)		3.79 (2.91)	28.51 (22.52)
Eurosceptic				-1.74 (1.08)	-2.36*** (0.80)	19.84 (20.91)
Interaction effect Seat share/Opposition						-0.03 (0.02)
Interaction effect Cohesion/Eurosceptic						-24.2 (22.52)
EU summit/month	1.95** (0.88)	1.95** (0.88)	1.96** (0.88)	1.95** (0.88)	1.96** (0.89)	2.00** (0.91)
Concurrent Meeting: Plenary	-2.18** (1.06)	-2.18** (1.06)	-2.20** (1.01)	-2.18** (1.06)	-2.20** (1.04)	-2.43*** (0.94)
Concurrent Meeting: Committees	0.53 (4.54)	0.53 (4.54)	0.56 (4.53)	0.53 (4.54)	0.55 (4.59)	0.65 (4.66)
Squared Distance EU elections (months) 6 <sup>th</sup> Parliament	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
	1.30*** (0.36)	1.29*** (0.37)	1.39*** (0.50)	1.21*** (0.35)	1.34*** (0.44)	1.75** (0.83)
Budget, Economy, Finances	3.43 (3.22)	3.43 (3.22)	3.38 (3.21)	3.43 (3.22)	3.40 (3.26)	3.29 (3.35)
Freedom, Security & Justice	1.62 (6.19)	1.62 (6.19)	1.59 (6.18)	1.62 (6.19)	1.60 (6.27)	1.53 (6.34)
Climate Change	0.14 (3.87)	0.14 (3.87)	0.13 (3.85)	0.14 (3.87)	0.13 (3.91)	0.13 (3.93)
Western Balkans	0.93 (3.42)	0.93 (3.42)	0.91 (3.41)	0.93 (3.42)	0.92 (3.46)	0.79 (3.53)
Energy	0.16 (1.12)	0.16 (1.12)	0.14 (1.13)	0.16 (1.12)	0.15 (1.14)	0.23 (1.15)
Migration	-0.40 (2.98)	-0.40 (2.98)	-0.47 (2.98)	-0.40 (2.98)	-0.44 (3.03)	-0.70 (3.14)
Constant	2.87 (1.80)	2.12 (1.68)	-2.39 (3.08)	3.47* (1.81)	-1.78 (3.63)	-24.39 (21.61)
DV >20% excluded	no	no	no	no	no	no
R Squared within	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27	0.27
R Squared between	0.13	0.17	0.32	0.34	0.52	0.52
R Squared overall	0.24	0.25	0.28	0.27	0.31	0.31
N (groups)	9	9	9	9	9	9
N	133	133	133	133	133	133

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable: relative registration numbers of EP groups at JPMs; all models in this table exclude the non-attached MEPs

**Table A4 Random-effects models, explaining registration rates of EP groups at JPMs II (excluding outliers and non-attached MEPs)**

	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
Opposition to Commission	-1.13 (0.91)				2.27*** (0.24)	2.32*** (0.43)
Seat share		0.06** (0.03)			0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.01)
Cohesion			6.25*** (2.46)		3.62 (2.59)	2.63 (16.45)
Eurosceptic				-2.10*** (0.66)	-2.02*** (0.36)	-3.04 (14.48)
Interaction effect Seat share/Opposition						0.00 (0.01)
Interaction effect Cohesion/Eurosceptic						(1.08) 15.88)
EU summit/month	1.49** (0.67)	1.49** (0.67)	1.49** (0.66)	1.48** (0.66)	1.49** (0.67)	1.48** (0.67)
Concurrent Meeting: Plenary	-2.07* (1.09)	-2.06* (1.09)	-2.09** (1.04)	-2.06* (1.09)	-2.08* (1.07)	-2.06* (1.08)
Concurrent Meeting: Committees	-3.25*** (1.10)	-3.27*** (1.10)	-3.24*** (1.12)	-3.34*** (1.08)	-3.30*** (1.12)	-3.33*** (1.14)
Squared Distance EU elections (months) 6 <sup>th</sup> Parliament	0.00* (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
	0.91** (0.40)	0.91** (0.40)	1.30*** (0.49)	0.90** (0.39)	1.08** (0.52)	1.01 (0.70)
Budget, Economy, Finances	5.80*** (1.10)	5.82*** (1.09)	5.77*** (1.08)	5.86*** (1.07)	5.82*** (1.08)	5.84*** (1.13)
Freedom, Security & Justice	3.05 (2.97)	3.05 (2.98)	3.36 (2.97)	3.38 (2.93)	3.47 (3.02)	3.50 (3.04)
Climate Change	3.81** (1.78)	3.83** (1.79)	3.83** (1.84)	3.90** (1.84)	3.88** (1.87)	3.90** (1.90)
Western Balkans	3.92*** (0.98)	3.94*** (0.98)	3.91*** (0.97)	4.00*** (0.98)	3.96*** (0.97)	3.99*** (1.02)
Energy	-0.55 (0.89)	-0.56 (0.89)	-0.58 (0.90)	-0.57 (0.89)	-0.58 (0.91)	-0.59 (0.91)
Migration	2.83** (1.21)	2.85** (1.22)	2.79** (1.17)	2.91** (1.21)	2.86** (1.22)	2.88** (1.15)
Constant	4.75 (0.60)	3.23 (0.95)	-1.23 (2.82)	5.04 (0.62)	-0.27 (3.08)	0.64 (15.19)
DV >20% excluded	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	Yes
R Squared within	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.30	0.31	0.31
R Squared between	0.20	0.30	0.32	0.53	0.63	0.63
R Squared overall	0.28	0.30	0.33	0.33	0.37	0.37
N (groups)	9	9	9	9	9	9
N	131	131	131	131	131	131

Note: \* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01; robust standard errors in parentheses; dependent variable: relative registration numbers of EP groups at JPMs; all models in this table exclude the two outliers as well as non-attached MEPs

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